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ONE YEAR REVIEW OF CRIMINAL LAW
AND PROCEDURE
By AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR.
Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Law
In the field of criminal law, the Colorado Supreme Court during
19581 decided about the usual number of cases-some twenty.five. The
Colorado Case of the Year,' which will doubtless prove to be the Colorado Criminal Case of the Decade because of its wide-spread impact
upon what has theretofore been considered settled law, is one which
has important effects both as to the substantive and as to the procedural
aspects of criminal law.
I.

SUBSTANTIVE

CRIMINAL LAW

Municipal Violations as Crimes
There are a number of proceedings, often related to criminal matters, which are somewhat akin to criminal proceedings but which are
commonly considered non-criminal (i.e., civil) or at the most only quasicriminal: habeas corpus proceedings (even when brought by an imprisoned convict);e juvenile delinquency proceedings;' proceedings to
recover statutory money penalties from wrongdoers; proceedings, in
connection with criminal prosecutions, to determine insanity subsequent
to the crime;' and proceedings for violations of municipal penal ordinances.' The Merris case ' strikes many Colorado municipal violationsup to 1958 uniformly held to be civil wrongs, not crimes-from the foregoing list. Henceforth, a municipal penal ordinance of a home rule
city is a crime if (1) there exists a counterpart state statute punishing
the same conduct or (2) the ordinance authorizes imprisonment as
punishment.' The problem of whether the violation of the municipal
ordinance of a non-home rule city is a crime under the same two circumstances is not decided by the Merris case and must await further word
from the supreme court.'
1 Because of time limitations imposed by the editors of DICTA for the submission of this annual review,
the cases discussed herein are those found in 319 P.2d through 332 P.2d no. 2, the latter containing Colorado
cases decided on Nov. 24, 1958. No Colo. Bar Ass'n Adv. Sh. presently issued contains Colorado cases decided
'after Nov. 24, 1958.
2Canon City v. Merris, 323 P.2d 614 (Colo. 1958), which contains two important holdings: (1) making
manv municipal violations crimes; (21 limiting municipal power to enact penal ordinances.
I E.g., McGrath v. Tinsley, 328 P.2d 579 (Colo. 1958); Riley v- Denver, 324 P. 2d 790 (Colo. 1958)-both
noted infra of notes 60, 64 and text. Habeas corpus is also available to others than imprisoned convictse.g., infants in custody cases, aliens in deportation cases, and persons committed to mental institutions for
reasons other than alleged criminal conduct.
4 Kohm v. People, 83 Colo. 300, 264 Pac. 718 (1928). The principle type of juvenile delinquency is the
commission by a juvenile of what would be a crime if committed by on adult. Cola. Rev. Stat. § 22.-81 (19531.
5 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 39-8-6 (1953) (insanity at the time of criminal trial, or of criminal judgment, or of
execution of the death penalty for crime).
6 The majority view in the United States is that municipal ordinance violations are civil wrongs against
the municipality, even when the violation is punishable by imprisonment, and even when the state criminal
low prohibits the same conduct which the ordinance forbids. 9 McQuillin, 'Municipal Corporations § 27.06
(3d ed. 1950).
7 See note 2 supra. The case involved a home rule city municipal ordinance punishing, by fine or imprisonment, driving under the influence of liquor. A counterpart state statute also forbids the same conduct,
thou-h the authorized punishment is somewhat greater.
Though the Merris case was somewhat vague as to item (2) above, the later case of Geer v. Alaniz,
makes it clear that a municipal ordinance is a crime if imprisonment is authorized, even
326 P.2d 71 (1958),
though there is no counterpart state statute; as well as a crime if there is a counterpart state statute, even
thouah only a fire Is authorized.
urging that
Scott, Municipal Penal Ordinances in Colorado, 30 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 267, 279 (1958,
'See
there is a counterpart state criminal statute or (2) imprisonthese violations also should be crimes if (1)
ment is an authorized penalty.
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The principal effect of this holding of the Merris case-that many
municipal violations, formerly held to be civil wrongs, are crimes-has
been procedural: the municipal courts which try municipal violators
must henceforth afford defendants those procedural rights to which
defendants are entitled in comparable state criminal trials. These will
be considered under the topic "Criminal Procedure" below.
Power to Create Municipal Crimes
Besides turning many a municipal violation from a mere civil
wrong into a crime, the Merris case severely limits the power of home
rule municipalities to enact penal ordinances. Before Merris, Colorado
followed the rule of most states to the effect that the state and the
home rule city possess concurrent power to enact laws punishing
identical conduct which is of both state-wide and local concern, so long
as the city ordinance does not conflict with the state statute."° One of
the holdings of the Merris case, however, is that, when a state criminal
statute punishes conduct of state-wide concern, the home rule city has
no power to enact a penal ordinance punishing the same conduct (and
conversely, that where a home rule city has enacted a penal ordinance
punishing conduct of local concern, a state statute punishing the same
conduct is inapplicable to such conduct committed within the municipal
territorial limits) . Questions as to what are matters of state-wide concern
(other than drunken driving, the specific matter involved in Merris)
as distinguished from matters of local concern; 1 as to what is the power
of a home rule municipality to enact an ordinance punishing conduct of
state-wide concern in the absence of state law on the subject; as to
whether the Merris case limits the municipal power of non-home rule
cities to an equal degree; and as to whether certain Colorado statutory
provisions delegating ordinance power concerning specific matters to
"local authorities" and "cities and towns" permits concurrent power in
spite of Merris-all such questions, not specifically raised by the Merris
case, must await further answers by the supreme court."' It may be that
some of the questions concerning municipal power to enact penal ordinances will be soon settled by legislation."
Drunk-Driving Death Statute
An important Colorado criminal statute, poorly worded, makes it
a felony, with a maximum punishment of fourteen years' imprisonment,
10 Colorado: Hughes v. People, 8 Colo. 536, 9 Poc. 50 (1885) (punishment by state no bar to punishment by city); Mclnerney v. Denver, 17 Coto. 302 29 Pac. 516 (18921 (some); People v. Graham, 107 Colo.
202, 110 P.2d 256 (1941) (recognizing concurrent power as to traffic matters). Other statesi 6 McQuillin,
Municipal Corporations c. 23 (3d ed. 1950).
"I The difficulty which will be encountered in classifying matters into one or the other of the two
categories-matters of state-wide concern, matters of local concern-is that so often a matter really concerns both the state and the locality. Driving under the influence, held by Merris to be a stote-wide matter,
is surely also a matter of local concern-actually of special concern to the people of the locality where the
driver does his driving.
12 See Scott, supra note 9, at 270-75, for some speculation concerning the answers to these questions.
13 The Colorado Municipal League has prepared a bill, to be offered in the 1959 legislative session, to
amend Colo. Rev. Stat. § 139-33-1 (1953) so as to enlarge municipal power beyond the narrow limits imposed
by the Merris case. The bill provides for concurrent state and municipal power (of home rule and non-home
rule municipalities) concerning matters of both state and local concern, unless the state statute on the sublect expressly preempts the field to the exclusion of municipol power. It further provides that, when both
state and municipality punish the same conduct, prosecution by the state bars prosecution by the city and
vice versa. The League proposes no legislation to change the other holding of the Merris case; that municipal
violations are generally crimes, which must be prosecuted according to the laws relating to criminal procedure.
The proposed legislation, insofar as it enlarges the power of home rule cities, may have difficulty withstanding attack on the basis of its constitutionality, since the IMerris case holding as to the municipal
ordinance power of home rule cities relied primarily upon the provision of Colo. Const. art. XX, § 6 (the
home rule amendment), that a home rule ordinance on a focal matter -supersedes- a state statute on the
sublect; the supreme court in Merris concluded from this that the converse must follow: a state statute on a
state-wide matter necessarily excludes municipal power.
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for one, while under the influence of liquor or drugs, to cause the death
of another by driving an automobile "in a reckless, negligent or careless manner, or with a wanton or reckless disregard of human life or
safety."" The difficulty concerns the degree of negligence which the
statute requires: will ordinary (tort) negligence do, as the words "careless" and "negligent" imply, or is some greater degree of negligence required, as the words "reckless" and "wanton or reckless disregard"
indicate? In view of the statute's use of the disjunctive "or," it might
seem that ordinary negligence, the lowest common denominator of the
various alternative terms, would be sufficient.15 Goodell v. People,"
however, holds that a greater negligence-called "criminal negligence"is necessary to satisfy the statute. The court reasoned that, since the
crime of involuntary manslaughter, a mere misdemeanor, requires this
higher degree of negligence, 7 a fortiori the drunk-driving-death crime,
a serious felony, should require as high a degree of negligence.
"Ordinary negligence" requires, in cases of tort liability for death,
that the defendant's conduct, under all the circumstances, create an unreasonable risk of harm to others, though the actor need not be aware
that his conduct creates such a risk. "Criminal negligence" requires
something more. But what is this something extra which criminal negligence needs but ordinary negligence does not? There are three possibilities: (I) a higher degree of risk than simply an unreasonable risk, 8
or (2) a subjective awareness by the defendant of the risk which his
conduct creates, or (3) both a greater risk and an awareness of the risk.
Though different jurisdictions give different answers, Colorado's answer seems to be the second of the above three: no greater risk is required for criminal negligence than for ordinary negligence, but (unlike
the requirements for ordinary negligence) the defendant must be aware
of the unreasonable risk which his conduct creates. 9 When, acting
riskily and knowing he is doing so, he yet goes ahead with his conduct,
14 Colo.

Rev, Stat.

as a felony, with a

§ 40-2-10 (1953).

maximum

A companion statute, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 40-2-11

punishment of

five years,

the

same conduct which

(1953),

causes bodily

punishes

injury instead

of death.
15 This is the view apparently adopted by the earlier case of Rinehart v. People 105 Colo. 123, 95
P.2d 10 (1939), purportedly distinguished in, but actually overruled by Goodell v. People, 327 P.2d 279
(Colo. 1958).
16 327 P.2d 279 (Colo. 1958), noted in 31 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 104 (1958).
'7 Trujillo v. People, 133 Colo. 186, 292 P.2d 980 (1956),
noted in 28 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 409 (1956).
18When the criminal negligence issue concerns liability for involuntary manslaughter or drunk-drivingdeath, risk means risk of death or serious bodily injury; when criminal liability for battery or drunk-drivinginjury is the issue, it means risk of bodily injury.
1' See note, Criminal Low-The Negligence Requirement for Involuntary Manslaughter, 28 Rocky Mt. L.
Rev. 409 11956), reaching this conclusion on the basis of the Colorado cases, which are riot, however, as
clear as they might be.
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he is an eligible candidate for a manslaughter (of the negligence type)
or for a drunk-driving-death prosecution if death results.
The Goodell opinion puts its stamp of approval on the following
instruction to the jury explaining the meaning of criminal negligence
in a drunk-driving-death prosecution:
"Criminal negligence is such a failure to observe the standard of conduct of an ordinarily careful and prudent person
under the conditions and circumstances, that the actor's conduct
partakes of a reckless disregard of life and a willful disregard of
the safety of others; such conduct is the equivalent of the intentional doing of an act with knowledge that substantial harm
will result and with a wanton and reckless disregard of the
probable consequences of said act.""0
With due respect, this is an almost meaningless string of words which
cannot serve as a proper guide for the jury. If the actor conducts himself in such a way as to endanger others, but is serenely unaware of the
danger, is he criminally negligent under this instruction? Though by
hypothesis he is not conscious of the risk created by his conduct, does
his conduct "partake" of a disregard of safety; is his conduct "the equivalent of" intentionally doing an act with knowledge of its riskiness? The
trouble lies in such words as "partake" and "is the equivalent of," which
seem to invite one to pretend that something exists (here, an awareness
of risk) which does not actually exist. It would seem much clearer to
instruct the jury, in manslaughter and drunk-driving-death prosecutions,
somewhat along these lines:
Criminal negligence requires (1) such a failure to observe the
standard of conduct of an ordinarily careful and prudent person
under the conditions and circumstances, that the actor's conduct
creates an unreasonable risk of death or serious bodily injury
to another or to others; and, in addition, (2) that the actor be
conscious that his conduct creates such a risk.2
Confidence Game
When one obtains money or property from another in exchange for
his check which later "bounces," there is often the troublesome problem
20 327 P.2d at 283.
2' Perhaps "unreasonable risk" would require some further explanation to the jury. Taking a certain risksay speeding through an intersection-may be reasonable ifdone for a socially useful reason (e.g., to speed
a sickperson to the hospital), or unreasonable if no such reason exists (e.g.,to enioy the thrill of fast
driving)
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of whether he has violated the short-check (misdemeanor) " or no-ac-

count-check (felony, five years maximum) statutes," or that punishing
obtaining property by false pretenses" (felony, ten years maximum, if over
$50 obtained) ; or the confidence game (felony, twenty years maximum)
statute." Bevins v. People" discloses some of the outer limits of the
nebulous crime of confidence game. First, the crime requires more from
the defendant than a promise, even a false promise (i.e., one the defendant intends, at the time he makes it, not to keep) ." Secondly, it
requires something in the way of the defendant's worming his way into
the victim's confidence, a requirement not satisfied when his confidence
is obtained through a course of regular business dealings conducted by
persons on an equal footing-admittedly a somewhat vague distinction.
Miscellaneous

Other Colorado cases concerned rather routine matters concerning
the substantive law of larceny" and burglary." Another case construed
various Colorado statutes to mean that robbery, when committed by a
youth over the age of juvenile delinquency but under twenty-one when
convicted, is a felony rather than a misdemeanor."° Another upheld the
constitutionality of the statute on habitual criminals."

A 1958 murder of a Boulder, Colorado, policeman raises the interesting question of the meaning of the vague phrase "in the perpetration"
found in the Colorado statute making it first degree murder for one to
murder another "in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate any arson,
rape, robbery, mayhem or burglary."" Here hoodlums robbed a storekeeper in Lyons, then fled by car to Boulder, some fifteen miles away,
arriving there half an hour after the robbery. Boulder policemen,
alerted to watch for the robbers, stopped their car. One of the robbers

shot and killed a policeman. "In the perpetration" is a matter of time,
place and causal connection between the felony in question, here robbery, and the killing. Here the time element is half an hour; the place,
fifteen miles away; the causal connection, the shooting was done to
avoid capture. Doubtless the Colorado Supreme Court will have to
decide the matter in the next year or two if the robbers, who have been
captured, are convicted of first degree murder on the theory of a killing
in the perpetration of the robbery.
Colo. Rev. Star.§ 40-14-10 (1953).
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 40-14-10 (Supp. 1957).
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 40-14-2 ISupp. 1957).
2' Colo. Rev. Stat. § 40-10-1 (1953) (punishing one who obtains money or property "by means of . . .
any false or bogus checks.
...
)
"6 330 P.2d 709 (Colo. 1958). Here defendant obtained $20 from a store-owner by giving him his check
for $20, asking him not to present the check to the bank but to hold it until a stated future date when defendant would return and repay the $20. The defendant and the storekeeper had entered into exactly the
same transaction a half dozen times before, and the former had always appeared on the appointed day with
the money. In this instance, the evening before the appointed day the defendant was arrested and (ailed
for a traffic violation. He then had on his person $26, from which he intended to repay the $20 he owed.
Because he failed to keep the appointment, the storekeeper presented the check to the bank.
rhe
check "bounced." Defendant was convicted of the crime of confidence game and sentenced to eight to
fifteen years in the penitentiary. The supreme court reversed and ordered his discharge, because on the evidence he was entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal.
2" A false promise will not do for false pretenses, which requires a falserepresentation as to an existing or post fact. People v. Orris, 52 Colo. 244. 121 Pac. 163 (1912). If a false promise is insufficient for
false pretenses, a fortiori it should be insufficient for the more serious crime of confidence game. Cf. Goodell
v. People, 327 P.2d 279 (Colo. 19581 (since involuntary manslaughter requires criminal negligence, a fortiori
the drunk-driving-death offense does).
28 Lee v. People, 326 P.2d 660 (Colo. 1958) (the fair market value of a gun stolen from a retail storenot its wholesale price or its retail price-is used to determine the issue of grand larceny v. petit larceny).
"' McGrath v. Tinsley, 328 P.2d 579 (Colo. 1958) (in Colorado, burglary may be committed by entering
.ithout breaking); Panion v. People, 331 P.2d 501 (Colo. 1958) (same).
30 Bartell v. People, 324 P.2d 378 (Cola. 1958).
"' Vigil v. People, 322 P.2d 320 (Colo. 1958).
32 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 40-2-3 11953).
2

2
2
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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Municipal Violations
As indicated above, one Merris" case holding-that municipal violations in home rule cities are crimes if there is a counterpart state
criminal statute or if imprisonment is an authorized punishment-has its
principal impact upon the procedure to be employed in municipal
courts of home rule cities. Doubtless the many rules of criminal procedure, constitutional, statutory and case law, applicable to comparable
state criminal prosecutions must now be employed in municipal prosecutions. As to constitutional requirements: trial in municipal courts must
be speedy, public, impartial and local; the defendant has a right to be
present; he has a right to cross-examine adverse witnesses." Though he
has a right to have employed counsel represent him, he probably has no
right to appointed counsel if indigent, since no such right is afforded
defendants in minor state criminal prosecutions. Probably the accusation
must be more specific than heretofore. The defendant need not take the
stand in his own defense (an aspect of the privilege against self-incrimination) and so cannot be questioned against his will by the municipal
judge. There can no longer be prosecution both by the city and by the
state on account of a single wrongful act (an abpect of double jeopardy).
He is entitled to a jury trial if he requests one because justice courts
afford trial by jury on request in comparable state criminal trials."
The non-constitutional procedural requirements of the Merris case
would seem to include: the defendant must be proved guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt rather than by a mere preponderance; the trial judge
may not direct a jury to find the defendant guilty; the rules of evidence
applicable in comparable state criminal proceedings must be followed;
the court may, in its discretion, suspend the sentence and place the
violator on probation; among other things."
Jurisdiction Over the Defendant
One who has, before his apprehension, committed both a federal
and a state crime, may afterwards be arrested and held by the one sovereign or the other, and the one which first assumes control over the defendant has jurisdiction over him to the exclusion of the other. But
that one may voluntarily relinquish jurisdiction to the other, and the
defendant cannot complain. So when the defendant, who has been
arrested, tried, convicted and sentenced to imprisonment by the federal
government, is handed over by the federal government, during the period of his imprisonment, for trial in the Colorado state courts, there is
no obstacle to the defendant's trial for his Colorado crime. 7
'3 Canon City v. Merris, 323 P.2d 614 (Colo. 1958)
(commented on in note 2 supra, as further explained
by Geer v. Alaniz, note 8 supra).
34 No doubt all these rights existed before Merris.
35 It would seem that trial by jury in justice courts is, however, not a constitutional right but one granted
by statute, so that the legislature could, if it wished, abolish trial by jury in justice and municipal courts.
Municipal courts of home rule cities, however, seem to have made, since Merris, a quick adjustment to the
trial-by-jury requirements imposed by that case, affording
a jury trial
to municipal defendants who ask for it.
3e For a more complete discussion of the procedural consequences of Merris, see Scott, supro note 9,
at 279-82.
7 Gonzales v. Horan, 332 P.2d 205 (Colo. 19581 (state court issued writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum directed to the federal warden, who, pursuant to regulation of the attorney neneral, voluntarily.
produced his prisoner In the state court). The court also held that when the Colorado district judge earlier
quashed a capias for the defendant's arrest, this did not operate to dismiss the information previously
filed against the defendant.
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Jurisdiction Over the Offense

The Colorado county courts have jurisdiction to try cases of wilful
non-support of wife and minor children," though the crime of non-support is a felony. A Colorado case held that the county court has power to
suspend sentence on condition the defendant pay $18,000, in installments,
for the support of his family, though in other matters the jurisdiction of
the county court is limited to matters involving less than $2,000."
Writ of Prohibition

Colorado defense attorneys in 1958 rediscovered the ancient prerogative writ of prohibition, a useful pre-trial maneuver to prevent the
threatened trial of a criminal defendant, available in limited circumstances of somewhat uncertain dimensions but related to a lack of
"
"jurisdiction" in the criminal trial court. In Bustamante v. District Court
the trial court had erroneously refused to quash the indictment, though
the prosecution was barred by the statute of limitations. In Markiewicz
v. Black" the trial court had wrongly refused to dismiss a prosecution
that was barred by the fact that the defendant had already been once iii
jeopardy for the same offense. In each case the petitioner, the threatened
criminal defendant, filed his petition for the writ in the supreme court,
seeking to restrain the respondent trial court from proceeding to trial.
After issuing an order to the respondent to show cause why the writ
should not be granted, the rule to show cause was made absolute and
respondent thus restrained.
In the Bustamante case the supreme court said that although the
writ "cannot be used for appealing cases on the installment plan," yet it
can be used in cases where the trial court, having no jurisdiction over
the subject matter or over the person of the petitioner, still threatens to
try him. To say that the trial court thus lacks jurisdiction because the
oftense is barred by the statute of limitations is surely to use the word
"jurisdiction" in a pretty loose sense.
In the Markiewicz case the court merely said that if prohibition is
proper when a threatened prosecution is barred by a mere statute, a
fortiori it is available for a thireatened prosecution barred by a provision
of the constitution. While thus giving pre-trial prohibition a rather
broad scope, the supreme court continues to limit narrowly the scope of
another (a post-conviction) prerogative writ, that of habeas corpus.'"
How far the court will go with prohibition to restrain trial courts which
have improperly ruled in other situations-e.g., improperly ruled there
is venue, or wrongly refused to quash a fatally defective indictment or
information, or perhaps even improperly failed to appoint counsel for
the defendant-remains to be developed by future cases.
Statute of Limitations

The Bustamante case, noted immediately above, also dealt with the
problem of the validity of a criminal accusation which on its face disthat the period of the statute of limitations has run and which does
. closes
not allege
facts (e.g., that the defendant fled from justice) taking the
3 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 43-1-4 (1953) (-All courts of record").
30 Tucker v. People, 136 Colo. 581, 319 P.2d 983 (1957, adhered to on rehearing 1958).
40 329 P.2d 1013 (Colo. 1958).
"u 330 t'.2d 539 (Colo. 1958).
42 In dealing with habeas corpus the Colorado courts refuse to allow the writ to release convicted persons unless the trial courtlacked *'urisdiction" in a much more limited sense than that word was used in
Bustamente. See, for instance, Lewis v. Tinsley, 330 P.2d 532 (Colo. 1958) (court has "jurisdiction" though
defendant is not represented by effective counsel, is insane when arraigned, is coerced into pleading guilty).
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prosecution out of the statute of limitations.' Prior Colorado cases had
held that the accusation is not to be quashed because it alleges dates
which show the prosecution is barred in the absence of an exception;
the defendant should show that no exception exists." These cases were
accordingly overruled by Bustainante. There is a conflict of opinion on
the matter in other jurisdictions." It would seem that it is important to
have a definite rule one way or the other, but it does not matter greatly
which rule is adopted.
The difficulties involved in successfully convicting Bustamante point
up the fact that embezzlement, including embezzlement by public officers
of public funds, should be treated differently from other crimes by the
statute of limitations. Often the actual embezzlement is followed by a
long period of successful juggling of the books by the embezzler, who
stays on the job (without "fleeing from justice") to prevent discovery.
He often succeeds for a long enough period for the statute to run. It is
often difficult too for the prosecution to tell when the embezzled moneys
were taken; often it knows only that they were taken sometime between
the times when the defendant began his employment and when his
wrongdoings were discovered. Some other jurisdictions sensibly have
adopted a special rule for this particular crime."
Miscellaneous Pre-Trial Matters
Colorado procedure requires that the names of the prosecution
witnesses be endorsed upon the accusation. In one case the trial court
properly exercised its discretion to allow the prosecution to call a witness not so endorsed, where the defendant did not, as he might have done,
ask for a continuance if surprised."
The same case upheld minor amendments to a larceny information
before and during trial, in order to make the proof conform to the
allegations concerning the description of the stolen property, since no
prejudice to the defendant resulted from these amendments.
Another case emphasized the discretion of the trial court ruling oil
a challenge for cause on voir dire."
Evidence at the Trial
Some of the Colorado criminal cases of 1958 involved problems of
evidence, '" but as these matters are treated in a separate article," they
are not discussed here.
4SThe indictment alleged that defendant, a public officer (county clerk), between May 24, 1953, and
October 19, 1954,. embezzled $1689 of public money. The offense being a misdemeanor, Bustamante v. People,
133 Colo. 497, 297 P.2d 538 (1956), subject to the eighteen months statute of limitations, and the indictment not having been returned until Feb. 28, 1955, twenty-one months after May 1953, prosecution was held
barred by the statute of limitations.
4 E.g., Packer v. People, 26 Colo. 306, 57 Poc. 1087 (1899).
(statute of limitation cannot be
'5 Compare People v. Kaplan, 143 Misc. 91, 256 N.Y. Supp. 874 (1932)
raised by demurrer to the indictment but only by plea of not guilty) with People v. McGee, 1 Cal. 2d
611, 36 P.2d 378 (1934) (statute of limitations is "jurisdictional" rather than a matter of affirmative defense and may be raised at any time, before or after judgment).

4eE.g., Wis. Crim Code § 939.74 (1955) (extension of time to one year after discovery of loss if less
than five years from the embezzlement); see Am. Law Inst., Model Penal Code § 1.07 (3)(a) and (b) (extension of time to one year after discovery if no more than three years

47 Gorum v. People, 320 P.2d 340 (Colo. 1958).
48 Leick v. People, 136 Colo. 535, 322 P.2d 674
opinion concerning
instructions).

defendant's guilt but can

put it

(1958)

aside and

longer than ordinary statute period).

(prospective

juror states he has formed

be governed by the evidence

an

and the courts

"WE.g., Leick v. People, supra note 45 (confessions of co-conspirators; admissions of defendant; confession not coerced though confessor not advised of right to counsel or warned that confession might be used
against him; one need not be doctor to give an opinion as to sanity; burden of proof in

criminal insanity

cases); Gorum v. People, 320 P.2d 340 (Colo. 1958) (evidence of similar offenses); Mitchell v. People, 320
P.2d 342 (Colo. 1958) (prior convictions to impeach defendant who takes the stand; the prior convictions
were alleged for habitual criminal purposes); Davis v. People, 321 P.2d 1103 (Colo. 1958) (defendant's recent
possession of goods obtained by burglary sufficient to sustain conviction for burglary).
en See One Year Review of Evidence, infra page 53.
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Other Trial Matters
One case held that although the prosecution may have introduced
insufficient evidence to prove the commission of the alleged crime by
the defendant, so that a motion for directed verdict at the close of the
prosecution's case should have been granted, yet the defendant, when
presenting his case, may fill the gap in the prosecution's proof, thus
curing the defect, so that a motion for the directed verdict should no
longer be granted."1
In most states the defense of insanity at the time of the alleged
crime is raised by a not-guilty plea. A minority of states, including Colorado, require a special plea of "not guilty by reason of insanity." Colorado is one of two states which make provision for a trial on the insanity
issue alone separate from the trial on all other issues. The Leick case5"
upheld the Colorado procedure splitting the trial into two parts, but it
held that although the trial is composed of two parts, it is only one trial,
leading to one judgment, so that there cannot be an immediate appellate
review of the insanity part before the trial on the other issues is had.
The Leick case also held that it is not reversible error for the district attorney in closing argument to read from the reporter's transcript
concerning testimony at the trial, so long as he does not say he is doing so
or, if the fact is known, so long as the court tells the jury that what
the witnesses had said is not necessarily true just because reduced to
writing.
:I Tucker v. People, 136 Colo. 581, 319 P.2d 983 (1957, adhered to on rehearing 1958).
e2 Leick v. People, 136 Colo. 535, 322 P.2d 674 11958).
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A plea of guilty to an accusation containing, in addition to a count
charging the substantive offense, other counts charging prior offenses
for habitual criminal purposes, obviates the necessity of proof of the
prior offenses. "
Appellate Review
In a 1957 case' the supreme court recognized the binding effect of
the United States Supreme Court's Griffin case"6 upon Colorado law;
Colorado is required to furnish at state expense a free transcript of trial
proceedings at the indigent defendant's request, in order to equalize
justice as between the rich and the poor. A 1958 Colorado case" adds a
limitation to this rule: the trial court need not order such a transcript
if it would be "a vain and useless thing"-meaning doubtless that the
trial court is certain that no reviewable reversible error occurred which
could serve as the basis of an appellate review.
The general rule, that there will be no appellate review of trial
errors unless objected to at the trial and later urged upon a motion for
new trial, was held in the same case to apply to a defendant who elects
to act as his own attorney. 7
Double Jeopardy
In Markiewicz v. Black5" defendant was charged with assault with
intent to rob X and pleaded guilty. In connection with the sentence the
district attorney, who had several robbery cases to prosecute, got confused
as to which defendants had robbed whom, and so he brought Y to court
instead of X; thereupon the trial judge dismissed the case. A new prosecution for assault to rob X was then begun. Without passing upon the
correctness of the trial court's dismissal,"9 the supreme court held that,
since the trial court had dismissed the prosecution once begun, the defendant had been in jeopardy, and a new prosecution would violate his
right not to be placed twice in jeopardy. In a non-jury case jeopardy
attaches as soon as the accused, on arraignment, has pleaded, the court
states. It would seem that the same rule would apply in a case where the
plea was not guilty but a jury was waived. In a jury trial on a not-guilty
plea jeopardy attaches when the jury is impanelled and sworn."0
Habeas Corpus and Coram Nobis
The supreme court considered several habeas corpus cases in 1958.

Although recognizing that for most purposes habeas corpus proceedings
are considered to be civil rather than criminal proceedings, even when

brought by prisoners convicted of crime, the court held that habeas
corpus may not be brought as a class action by some prisoners in behalf
of themselves and others similarly situated;6" and also that the court
which finds that a prisoner is entitled to release in habeas corpus proceedings cannot properly stay the execution of its order for release
5a Vigil v. People, 322 P.2d 320 (Colo. 1958).
54 In re Patterson, 136 Colo. 401, 317 P.2d 1041 (1957).
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
56 Kirkendoll v. People, 331 P.2d 809 (Colo. 1958) (defendant pleaded guilty to conspiracy to rape and
received a stiff sentence; the severity of sentence is not reviewable).
67 Apparently defendant either could afford counsel or refused apoinlted counsel.
But if one must act
as his own attorney because he is indigent and no counsel is offered him, this rule seems too harsh.
A 330 P.2d 539 (Colo. 1958).
69 It would seem that the trial judge should have continued the case until X could appear to testify that
the defendant had tried to rob him.
662 King, Colorado Practice Methods § 2389 (1955).
el Riley v. Denver, 324 P.2d 790 (Colo. 1958) (an aftermath of the Merris case; habeas corpus was
brought on behalf of those imprisoned as a result of municipal court trials in violation of the principles of
thatcase).
65
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pending a determination on appellate review of the correctness of the
order to discharge." As it turned out, on review, in the case where the
stay was requested, the order was incorrect, " but, as the court pointed
out, little would be left of the writ of habeas corpus if the prisoner, held
to be entitled to discharge, could yet be held "during all the weary
process of an appeal begun without leave and languidly continued.""
On the other hand the court disapproved of a trial court practice of
appointing counsel to represent a prisoner during habeas corpus proceedings, on the ground that the proceedings are civil rather than
criminal."
As to grounds for habeas corpus, Colorado takes a very narrow
view,"0 limiting the writ's scope to situations where the convicting court
lacked jurisdiction over the offense or over the defendant or gave a
sentence beyond the limits provided by the statute; and by "jurisdiction"
in habeas corpus matters the court seems to mean jurisdiction in the
Geer v. Alaniz, 326 P.2d 71 (1958) (alsoan aftermath of the Merris case).
Geer v. Alaniz, 331 P.2d 260 (Colo. 1958). Here petitioners convicted at municipal court trials conducted procedurally on the assumption that the trials were for civil wrongs, and sentenced to imprisonment,
were not entitled to habeas corpus, since by failing to object they waived their constitutional rights. But
aside from the waiver, the Colorado view is that violations of constitutional rights (e.g., to jury trial, to
counsel, not to incriminate one's self) are not grounds for habeas corpus. See Lewis v. Tinsley, 330 P.2d 532
(Colo. 1958), discussed below at note 67 and accompanying text.
64 A quotation from Chief Justice Cardozo, in People ex rel.Sabotino v. Jennings, 246 N.Y. 258,
158
N.E. 613, 614 (1927).
65 McGrath v. Tinsley, 328 P.2d 579 (Colo. 1958).
60 Freeman v. Tinsley, 135 Colo. 62, 308 P.2d 220 (1957), cert.denied, 355 U.S. 843 (1958), discussed in
Scott, One Year Review of Criminal Low and Procedure, 35 DICTA 26, 28, 34-35 (1958).
62
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narrow sense of power to hear and decide." The 1958 case of Lewis v.
Tinsley" continued this narrow viewpoint, holding that petitioner's
allegations that he was unrepresented by effective counsel, was insane
when arraigned, and was coerced into pleading guilty to robbery and
assault with intent to murder-these allegations alleged no grounds for
habeas corpus. This follows because there was no allegation of lack ot
jurisdiction or sentence beyond statutory limits and because the petitioner after conviction never applied for a writ of error.
It is quite clear that the Lewis allegations if true, as they should be
assumed to be on a petition for habeas corpus,' disclose violations of
constitutional rights under both the federal and state constitutions. It
is also quite clear that as a practical matter the conviction was not effectively, appealable. An insane person can hardly appeal. Even a sane
man without adequate counsel cannot effectively obtain appellate review,
and the coercion which produces a guilty plea generally continues long
enough to prevent appeal."0 In other words, the matter which violates
the constitution may also effectively prevent appellate review. Furthermore, on writ of error it is generally not possible to review matters not
in the record, and the insanity of the defendant and the coercion of the
guilty plea would not normally appear there.
There is therefore a serious gap in Colorado's scheme of justice in
cases of criminal convictions which are not effectively appealable obtained in violation of state or federal constitutional rights. Habeas
corpus, if limited to jurisdictional matters, is too narrow to'be of much
help. The gap must be filled, it would seem, by that other postconviction remedy of uncertain scope-the writ of error coram nobis
(perhaps today called "motion to vacate judgment of conviction") which should in Colorado be as broad as habeas corpus is narrow. The
three writs-the writ of error, the writ of habeas corpus, and the writ of
error coram nobis-must in combination afford adequate remedies for
relief against constitutional violations if the administration of justice
in Colorado is to measure up to the high standards which Colorado
defendants deserve.
'7 Compare the word "jurisdiction" in prohibition cases, e.g., Bustamante v. District Court, 329 P.2d 1013
(Colo. 1958) (no jurisdiction over a prosecution barred by the statute of limitations).
"8330 P.2d 532 (Colo. 1958).
S Very likely they were not actually true but the truth may be determined at a hearing when the
writ is granted. No such hearing was, of course, ordered here, since the writ was denied.
70 In Colorado a supreme court rule provides that a writ of error must be brought within six months
after judgment.
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